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1 MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL) 
4139 NORTH DEVONSHIRE CIRCLE 
2 I PROVO, UTAH 84604 
3 I in Pro se 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
4 ' 
5 I In re Marriage of: ) CASE NUMBER 784449259 
6 I GERALD D. LUNDAHL M.D. 
APPEAL CASE No 20030800-CA 
7 I Plaintiff ) 
) RESPONDENT'S ADDENDUM TO HER 
8 I ) OPENING BRIEF—REGISTERING THE 
) CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS 
9 I ) OPINION FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2004 
) IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR 
10 I ) COURT. 
11 
12 
MARLENE TELFORD (LUNDAHL)  
Respondent 
13 The Respondent in filing the California Court of Appeal, District Four, Division 
14 Three's Opinion before the Utah Court of Appeals assists in large measure to validate 
15 additional evidence that Utah does have jurisdiction to make it's own orders under 
16 RURESA, which allows the Respondent to register them in the California Superior Court 
17 of Orange County for collection. 
18 Therefore, the Respondent in addition to attaching the California Court of Appeals 
19 Opinion will out line for the benefit of the court positions taken by the California Court 
20 of Appeals. 
21 1) The California Appeals Court Opinion on page (24) explicitly states: "Because 
22 neither the parties' 1977 California decree, nor RURESA nor UIFSA support Lundahl's 
23 argument that the California Courts were vested with exclusive spousal Support 
24 jurisdiction, the trial court's order confirming registration of the Utah support orders is 
25 affirmed" 
26 I 2) The Utah Appeals Court will also note on page (23) of the Opinion that in both 
27 
28 
1 the text of the Opinion including footnotes that the "California Appeals Court finds that 
2 RURESA is the act which governs the Utah orders, thereby giving full faith and credit to 
3 the Utah orders, upon registration in the Courts of Califbrnia". (See Footnotes page (23) 
4 of Opinion. The Court also states on the same page that the California Order of 1994fs 
5 reduction to $500 per month is [suspect]". The September 23, 2003 Utah order states: 
6 "that Utah did not have Subject matter nor personal jurisdiction over the matters before 
7 the Court" which brings to the table the prior Utah Order written by the Honorable Judge 
8 Guy Burningham which succinctly states that Utah does have subject matter and 
9 personal jurisdiction, See (Exhibit # 2 Utah 1995 Order) moreover, the California 
10 Appeals court in their Opinion page (23) in footnotes stipulates . . . referring to the Utah 
11 Order of April 1995 "the Utah court has jurisdiction over this matter . . ." 'On the 
12 limited record before us, we fail to see how the issue of Utah subject matter jurisdiction 
13 was not res judicata." ( referring to the present Utah ruling of 2003 which is now 
14 before the Utah Court of Appeals). 
15 3) All Utah Orders are res judacata, since the Plaintiff never challenged nor did 
16 he appeal any of the Utah Orders. 
17 The Respondent wishes the court also take note of page (22) where the California 
18 Appeals Court states, "We also decline to take notice of the new [Utah 2003] order 
19 because, on the sparse Utah record Lundahl presents, we are skeptical it will survive 
20 appeal . . . thus the new order's contrary conclusion appears erroneous. 
21 4) Both Utah and California expressly recognize that under RURESA sister states 
22 may issue independent support orders for differing amounts without having modified, 
23 superceded, or nullified each other's orders." California Appeal Court Opinion now 
24 referred to as CACO. See p. 11. See also last paragraph. 
25 5) "Hence, the principles articulated for RURESA child support orders apply 
26 equally to spousal support orders. . ." p. 12.CACO 
27 
28 2 
1 6) "Lundahl's argument that the California divorce decree was controlling, and 
2 that the subsequent Utah support orders were void under RURESA, is simply wrong", p 
3 13, CACO 
4 7) "Under UIFSA, the support orders themselves will continue to have vitality, in 
5 short, UIFSA is specifically designed to function with the earlier acts without conflict' 
6 CACO p. 15 
7 8) "Parties wishing to modify a decree must do so in the [orders] original forunf 
8 Lundahl must appear in Utah if he desires to modify the Utah court's spousal support 
9 orders." p. 19 CACO 
10 9) "And while UIFSA worsens Lundahl's dilemma because in-state 
11 modification is no longer available, he has only himself to blame for not appearing in 
12 the Utah actions in which additional support was ordered." p. 19 CACO 
13 10) " We decline to take notice of the new Utah Order for several reasons: 
14 'First, Lundahl concedes the order is not yet final. Only final 
judgments are entitled to full faith and credit. Because of the 
15 I uncertainty surrounding the appeal of the [Utah] Order and its 
finality, we conclude taking notice of the order is not 
16 I appropriate, p. 21 CACO' 
17 I 'Second, The uncertain scope of the new Utah order militates against our 
taking notice of it (Note entire paragraph p.22 CACO') 
i s ; 
'Thirdly, We also decline to take notice of the new [Utah] order because, 
19 I on the sparse Utah record Lundahl presents, we are skeptical it will survive 
appeal, p. 21 CACO'" . . . Etc., 
20 " 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
The Respondent submits the California Court of Appeal's Opinion, and 
respectfully requests the Utah Court of Appeals notes the depth and details of the 
California Court of Appeal's decision, thereby closing any door which the Plaintiff might 
consider in another appeal before the California jurisdiction. 
, - ,MA^ Date rffldlZJQ&f 
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MICHAEL D ESPLIN (1009) 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
43 East 200 North 
P O Box L 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
Telephone (801) 373-4912 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD D LUNDAHL, 
Plaintiff, 
v s 
RUTHM LUNDAHL, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, ORDER 
MODIFYING DECREE AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No 784449259 
(Judge Guy R Burningham) 
This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled court on the 27th day of January, 1995, 
the Honorable Guy R. Burningham, presiding. This matter had originally been set for the 26th of 
January, 1995, but was continued by the Court to the following day This matter was before the Court 
for an evidentiary hearing on defendant's Petition to Modify the order of alimony and plaintiffs Counter-
Petition to Modify The defendant was present and was represented by counsel, Michael D Esplin The 
plaintiff was not present, nor was he represented by counsel The Court notes the notice of withdrawal 
submitted by plaintiffs counsel, Dana Burrows notifying the plaintiff of his withdrawal as counsel and 
advising the plaintiff of the trial date and the importance of his appearance The Court noted that the 
plaintiff had not appeared on January 26, 1995, that the Court had not been contacted by plaintiff nor by 
1 
anyone on his behalf. The defendant's attorney, Michael D. Esplin, also indicated to the Court that he 
had appeared on January 26, 1995, at the time set originally for the trial of the matter, and that he had 
searched the courthouse for the plaintiff and could not locate him. The Court noted the motion 
4 II previously filed by defendant to strike the pleadings of the plaintiff, granted said motion, and proceeded 
5 to hear the testimony and receive evidence in this matter. The Court, being fully advised in the premises, 
6 having heard testimony and received evidence, now therefore makes the following: 
7 FINDINGS 
8 1. The Court finds that this Court has continuing jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the 
9 plaintiff. 
10 2. The Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to obey the previous orders of the Court in regard 
11 to providing discovery sought by defendant, has given false and misleading testimony during depositions 
12 in this matter, and has not cured his contempt citation previously found by the Court. 
13 3. The Court therefore finds that the pleadings of the plaintiff should be stricken and defendant 
14 allowed to proceed with evidence on her petition. 
15 1 4. The Court finds that there has been a material and substantial change in the circumstances of 
16 ]| the defendant in that since the last alimony award in this matter the defendant has become disabled and 
17 unable to obtain meaningful employment with which to support herself 
18 5. The Court finds that defendant is in need of alimony based upon the length of the marriage of 
19 the parties, the present disability of the defendant, her inability to earn income as a result of the disability, 
20 defendant's monthly expenses. 
21 5. The Court finds that the plaintiff is involved in the operation of five diet centers in the State 
22 I of California, is a medical doctor, and is capable of providing alimony to the defendant. 
23 
1 6. Based upon the needs of the defendant and the ability of the plaintiff to earn income, the Court 
2 finds that the alimony of the defendant should be modified to the sum of $2,235.00 per month. This 
3 amount is found by the Court to be fair and reasonable in the premises. 
4 7. The Court further finds that pursuant to the temporary order of the Court, that the plaintiff 
5 is in arrears since the last judgment of the Court in February, 1993, in the total amount of $62,100.00 for 
6 which judgment should enter against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant. The arrearage is based 
7 upon the temporary alimony and child support award of $3,000.00 per month, adjusted by deducting the 
8 sum of $300.00 of said amount representing the amount of child support and multiplying the remainder 
9 of $2,700.00 by the months which have passed since the last judgment, the plaintiff having paid nothing 
10 since that time. 
11 8. The Court finds that the defendant has been required to seek the services of an attorney to 
12 pursue this matter and to respond to the Counter-petition of the plaintiff. The plaintiff in this matter has 
13 been deceptive and refused to provide factual and accurate documents and discovery responses. The 
14 attitude and actions of the plaintiff have required additional time and effort on the part of defendant's 
15 counsel to meet and refute the claims of the plaintiff and to support the allegations of the defendant. The 
16 Court finds that the sum of $5,200.00 is a reasonable and necessary amount of attorneys fees in this 
17 matter. The Court further finds that the defendant does not have the ability or resources to pay attorneys 
18 fees and that it is reasonable that the defendant be awarded judgment against the plaintiff in the amount 
19 of $5,200.00 
20 NOW THEREFORE, having made the foregoing Findings, the makes the following: 
21 ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
22 I 1. The previous orders in this matter are modified to provide that the defendant is awarded the 
23 
sumof SS2:23JjQQ^r month as alimony and the plaintiff is ordered to pay said amount effective beginning 
February 1, 1995. Said amount shall be paid in two equal monthly installments of $1,117.50, the first 
payment due on or before the 5th day of each month and the second due on or before the 20th day of 
each month. 
2. Defendant is awarded judgment against the plaintiff in the amount of $62,100.00 for arrearages 
in alimony ordered pursuant to the temporary order of this Court. 
3. Defendant is also awarded judgment against the plaintiff in the amount of $5,200.00 for her 
attorneys fees incurred in this matter. 
Dated the _Z2^ay of April, 1995. 
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•v.'•-».. U T A H .....•.' • 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL 
Plaintiff 
27365 Jefferson Avenue, Suite L 
Temecula, California 92590 
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Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Cltrk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GERALD D LUNDAHL, ; 
Petitioner, ; 
vs. > 
RUTH M LUNDAHL, i 
Respondent. > 
Ruling 
| CASE NO. 784449259 
| DATE: July 21, 2003 
Judge Laycock 
This matter is before the Court on petitioner's Morion to Strike Respondent's Order to 
Show Cause, Motion for Order to Show Cause, and Supporting Affidavit. Oral arguments were 
presented on May 29, 2003 before Judge Laycock. Gerald D. Lundahl ("petitioner") was present 
and represented David O. Drake. Ruth M. Lundahl ("respondent") was present and represented 
by Michael D. Esplin. After the parties' presentations, the Court took the matter under 
advisement and allowed the parties an additional period of time to file supplemental briefs on the 
issue of jurisdiction. On June 5, 2003, the parties entered into a stipulation to enlarge the time to 
file the supplemental briefs to June 11, 2003 
During the supplemental briefing period petitioner, without the aid of or knowledge of his 
attorney, began filing various documents with the Court. Some of the documents were prepared 
by Holly Lundahl, petitioner's daughter, and some were purportedly filed by David O. Drake, 
petitioner's attorney On June 19, 2003, the Court received & Notice of Termination of Special 
Appearance Counsel David Drake and Demand for Automatic Stay of Proceedings for 20 Days 
1 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, On June 27, 2003, David O Drake filed a 
motion asking the Court to withdraw the documents that petitioner had personally filed. The 
Court GRANTS petitioner's motion to withdraw said documents and has removed the documents 
from the record. On July 3, 2003, the Court received an Affidavit of Petitioner Confirming 
Representation of David Drake and Withdrawing Documents Filed By Holly Ltmdahl 
Petitioner's affidavit confirms that he is currently and has been continuously represented by David 
O. Drake. This being the case, the Court will now rule on the various motions still pending before 
this Court. 
PROCEDURAL FACTS 
The parties were divorced in California in September of 1977. On May 17, 1978, 
petitioner filed a complaint in this Court requesting that the California decree of divorce be made 
a decree of this Court. On June 26, 1978, respondent filed an answer and counterclaim to the 
complaint requesting a modification of the amount of alimony and child support awarded by the 
California decree On July 10, 1978, petitioner filed a reply to the counterclaim. On December 
26, 1979, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that since the California court 
had already ruled upon support and alimony in the original action, this Court's jurisdiction was 
limited to the issues raised by petitioner at that time The petitioner's motion for summary 
judgment was denied April 28, 1980 On June 30, 1980, the parties entered into a written 
stipulation to modify the alimony and child support which both parties signed. Said stipulation 
2 
included a provision that either party could petition the Court for a re-evaluation of alimony and 
child support at any time that he or she deemed proper and appropriate. On July 7, 1980, this 
Court entered an order in conformity with the aforementioned written stipulation. Thereafter, this 
Court received and ruled on various motions presented by both parties. 
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STRIKE SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
Petitioner contends that respondent's supplemental memorandum in opposition to the 
petitioner's Motion to Strike Respondent's Order to Show Cause, Motion for Order to Show 
Cause, and Supporting Affidavit should be stricken because it was untimely filed. Respondent 
has not responded to this motion. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration, 
respondent's time to respond has lapsed. Therefore, the Court enters the following ruling. 
The June 6, 2003 stipulation of the parties states that the parties "stipulate that the time be 
enlarged from June 6, 2003 to June 11, 2003 to file the additional briefs requested by the Court at 
the May 29, 2003 hearing." On June 11, 2003, petitioner filed his supplemental memorandum in 
support. On June 13, 2003, respondent filed her supplemental memorandum in opposition. 
Petitioner urges the Court to strike respondent's supplemental memorandum in opposition 
because it was filed two days late according to the June 6, 2003 stipulation The Court 
recognizes that respondent's memorandum was untimely filed. However, due to the confusion 
created by petitioner and Holly LundahTs filing of additional documents, which allegedly 
3 
supplemented the record and even purported to terminate petitioner's counsel's representation, 
the Court will excuse the untimeliness and will consider respondent's supplemental memorandum 
in opposition. Accordingly, the Court DENIES petitioner's Motion to Strike Respondent's 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike. 
MOTION TO STRIKE RESPONDENT'S ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE, AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT 
Petitioner urges the Court to strike the Order to Show Cause, Motion for Order to Show 
Cause, and Supporting Affidavit of respondent. Petitioner argues that the original spousal 
support order was entered by the California Superior Court and that the California court, by its 
express decree, retained continuing jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of spousal 
support and child support. 
In support of his argument, petitioner propounds as authority Child Support Enforcement 
Division of Alaska v. Brenckle, 675 N.E 2d 390 (Mass 1997). Therefrom, petitioner asserts the 
applicability of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") to this case. Petitioner 
argues that UIFSA should be applied retroactively, and that UIFSA provides the proper 
procedural framework for enforcing one state's support order in another jurisdiction The Court 
agrees with this argument 
InState of Utah, Dept of Human Services v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App 52, 975 P.2d 939 
(Utah Ct App 1999), the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's finding that UIFSA 
should be applied retroactively Id at ^ 14, 942 In so doing, the court stated that the policy of 
4 
UIFSA is to ensure that there is uniformity in the enforcement of child support orders between the 
states and that the retroactive application of the statute furthers that policy. Id. Pursuant to this 
holding from the appellate court, this Court finds that UIFSA is retroactive and must be applied to 
the facts of this case. 
Accepting petitioner's argument that UIFSA applies retroactively and is therefore 
applicable to this case is not, however, dispositive of this Court's authority to hear this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-206(3) (2002), which is titled "Enforcement and modification of 
support order by tribunal having continuing jurisdiction" states, "A tribunal of this state which 
lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order may not serve as a 
responding tribunal to modify a spousal support order of another state." Accordingly, this Court 
cannot act as the responding tribunal, i.e., cannot modify the California divorce decree, unless this 
Court has "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." In Jacoby, the Utah Court of Appeals held: 
The method by which a Utah court obtains 'continuing, exclusive jurisdiction5 
over a spousal support order is by 'issuing a support order consistent with the law 
of this state ' Thus, a Utah court cannot obtain 'continuing, exclusive jurisdiction' 
unless it issues the spousal support order. 
M(quoting Utah Code Ann § 78-45f-205(6)). Under Jacoby, this Court does not have 
"exclusive, continuing jurisdiction," unless it is the issuing state The facts of this case clearly 
establish that the spousal support order was issued by California, which according to UIFSA, is 
the only court that has jurisdiction to modify the spousal support order Accordingly, this Court 
5 
finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter under Utah's 
version of UIFSA. 
However, even though this Court does not have continuing exclusive jurisdiction under 
Utah's UIFSA, the California Court in its September 27, 2002 order clearly found that, under 
California law, Utah and California have concurrent jurisdiction over this matter This Court 
reads the September 27, 2002 order signed by Commissioner Julee Robinson of the California 
Superior Court for Orange County to mean that the California Court has recognized Utah's 
jurisdiction-both personal and subject matter jurisdiction: 
The Court finds that the only issue remaining is the issue of the amount of 
arrears owed 
The Court finds that the Utah Court did have personal jurisdiction over 
Petitioner at the time that the Utah Orders were made, and that the Utah Court had 
emergency jurisdiction for any temporary Orders 
The Utah Court had jurisdiction to make the orders because there was 
concurrent jurisdiction in both Utah and California The Utah Orders are entitled 
to Registration Petitioner submitted insufficient proof to show that the Utah 
orders were vacated, suspended or modified by later orders Petitioner submitted 
insufficient proof to show that some or all of the arrears are unenforceable The 
Court finds that the Orders can be confirmed in part, except as to whether the 
amount of arrears is incorrect 
The California Court has concluded that, under its laws, Utah's prior orders are enforceable. 
In its September 27, 2002 order, the California Court scheduled a July 9, 2002 telephonic 
hearing on the amount of the arrears Neither party has provided this Court with an order which 
was a result of that hearing or which resolved that issue in the California Court This Court will 
enforce any such order when a copy is provided However, this Court cannot, at this time, 
6 
enforce a prior support order which is currently being modified (or has been modified) in the 
California Court. Accordingly, the Court will strike Respondent's Order to Show Cause, Motion 
for Order to Show Cause, and Supporting Affidavit and will await a new order to show cause 
after this issue has been completely resolved by the California Court. 
Finally, respondent contends that res judicata precludes this Court from addressing the 
issue of subject matter jurisdiction; however, respondent has not provided the Court with a final 
order or ruling establishing that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction has been explicitly ruled on 
by a court in this jurisdiction.1 Accordingly, this Court finds that respondent has not established 
the requisite elements ofres judicata and, as such, respondent's argument fails. 
Because this Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case under Utah's 
version of UIFSA, the Court GRANTS petitioner's Morion to Strike Respondent's Order to Show 
Cause, Motion for Order to Show Cause, and Supporting Affidavit. The Court orders petitioner 
to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
!The Court has carefully reviewed the 3-volume file, but has found neither a ruling nor an 
order in which subject matter jurisdiction was explicitly ruled upon by any of the previous judges 
If such a ruling was made on the record, respondent would need to provide a transcript of such 
hearing for this court's consideration. 
7 
Dated as Provo, Utah this**H day of July, 2003 
v. * ? iN ^* 
4/ IAMUL^ C 
CLAUDIA L^YCOCK ( 
\ \L Fourth District Court Judge 
Case no. 784449259 ^ £ ^ 3 * ^ 
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CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 
DIVISION THREE 
GERALD D. LUNDAHL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
RUTH M. TELFORD, 
Defendant and Respondent; 
ORANGE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 
CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, 
Intervener and Respondent. 
G030846 
COURTOFAPPEAL4THDISTDIV3 
F I L E u 
FEB 2 7 2004 
Deputy Clerk, 
(Super. Ct. No. 01FL007984) 
O P I N I O N 
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Julee 
Robinson, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed. 
Family Law Appellate Associates and Jeffrey W. Doeringer for Appellant. 
Ruth M. Lundahl, in pro. per., for Respondent. 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, James M. Humes, Assistant Attorney 
General, Frank S. Furtek and Mary Dahlberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for Intervener 
and Respondent. 
Barry J. Brooks as Amicus Curiae, upon the request of the Court of Appeal. 
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 976(b) and 976.1, this opinion is 
certified for publication with the exception of parts II A., II B., and II D. 
Gerald Lundahl contends the trial court erred in denying his petition to 
vacate registration of several Utah spousal support orders in favor of his former wife, 
Ruth Telford. Lundahl argues the five Utah orders, issued between 1991 and 1999, are 
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the parties' 1977 divorce in California 
invested California with exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support. We disagree and 
affirm. In doing so, we revisit well-established provisions of the Revised Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURES A) pemiitting concurrent support orders 
in different jurisdictions for differing amounts. We consider whether RURESA's 
replacement, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), codified at Family 
Code section 4900 et seq.,1 establishes a mechanism for settling upon a single order as 
controlling among multiple spousal support orders, as opposed to child support orders. 
Under UIFSA's express terms, we conclude there is no provision for a single controlling 
spousal support order. 
I 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Lundahl and Telford were married in Utah in 1952. They later moved to 
Los Angeles. After 25 years of marriage and 12 children, Lundahl and Telford divorced 
in 1977. The divorce decree, issued by the Los Angeles family court, set child support at 
$1,600 per month and spousal support at $600 per month. A paragraph in the decree 
labeled, "Reservation of Jurisdiction" stated: "The court reserves jurisdiction of the 
above-entitled matter and as to all such issues as may be necessary to effect the purposes 
and intent of this order." The decree awarded Telford custody of the minor children and 
1
 All further statutory references are to this code, unless otherwise specified. 
2 
she returned to Utah. The next year, Lundahl alleged problems had developed with his 
visitation rights. He filed an action in the Utah courts, and the visitation issue was 
apparently resolved. 
In 1987, Lundahl renewed litigation in Los Angeles. The matter was 
transferred to Orange County. On August 24, 1987, the Orange County court set child 
support at $1,800 per month for four children until the eldest emancipated, then $1,500 
for three children until the next eldest emancipated, then $1,200 per month for two 
children until one emancipated, and finally $600 per month until the youngest 
emancipated. The court set spousal support at $L000 per month until the eldest child 
emancipated, whereupon it would increase to $1,050 until the youngest child 
emancipated, and then continue at $1,250 until the death of either party or remarriage of 
Telford. 
In 1989, on Lundahl's motion, the Orange County court modified custody 
by awarding him physical custody of one of the parties' minor children. Telford did not 
appear. 
In 1991, seeking enforcement of child and spousal support, Telford filed in 
Utah the first of several petitions that are the subject of this appeal. Lundahl did not 
appear at a hearing on the court's order to show cause on April 24, 1991. The court 
found Lundahl had ceased paying $3,000 a month in "family" support and ordered him to 
resume paying that amount. Lundahl appeared at the next hearing on August 29, 1991, 
Throughout the ensuing years, it seems numerous proceedings took place in 
Utah, resulting in stipulations by the parties and court orders. The parties allude to these 
proceedings but, except for the orders we discuss below that are the subject of this 
appeal, it appears no other Utah proceedings were before the trial court or figured in its 
registration decision. Lundahl elected to bring up the trial court record by way of 
appendices instead of clerk's transcripts (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.1.), so he has only 
himself to blame for any record omissions. 
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and the court set arrears at $3,500. Neither the $3,000 monthly "family" support amount, 
nor the $3,500 arrears amount were broken down into separate amounts for child and 
spousal support. 
Lundahl again visited the Orange County courthouse in 1993, seeking 
custody of the parties5 only remaining minor child. The court granted Lundahl's custody 
request and terminated his child support obligation. Telford did not appear. 
The same year, a judgment in the Utah court established arrears at $29,200 
through February 1993. Lundahl appeared at this hearing. He argued the court had no 
jurisdiction over "support arrearages and in fact California has jurisdiction over this 
matter." But the court expressly concluded it had jurisdiction. The $29,200 in arrears 
ordered by the court was a lump sum; it did not distinguish between child and spousal 
support. 
In November 1994, Lundahl sought a reduction of spousal support in 
Orange County. Telford testified and the matter was continued. She failed to appear at 
the next hearing, and spousal support was reduced to $500 per month, beginning July 
1994. Lundahl asserts this is the controlling amount. 
Lundahl owned property in Riverside County, California. To avoid a lien 
on the property, Lundahl entered into a stipulation in January 1995 with the Riverside 
County District Attorney's Office. He agreed his "child support and/or arrears" from 
August 1991 through December 1994 were $31,498.18, and consented to pay $1,852.83 
per month towards these arrears. The stipulation, filed in the Riverside County Superior 
Court, expressly included the $500 per month due under the 1994 Orange County spousal 
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support order, but did not specify whether any other portion of the "arrears" was for 
accrued spousal support or only for delinquent child support.3 
In April 1995, on Telford's petition, the Utah court set spousal support at 
$2,235 per month and arrears at $62,100, plus attorney fees of $5,200. Lundahl did not 
appear at the hearing on the petition. The court's order noted the $62,100 arrearage was 
"based upon the temporary alimony and child support award of $3,000.00 per month, 
adjusted by deducting the sum of $300.00 of said amount representing the amount of 
child support and multiplying the remainder of $2,700.00 by the months which have 
passed since the last judgment, the plaintiff having paid nothing since that time." 
Telford then attempted to set aside the Orange County court's 1994 spousal 
support order. In a motion to vacate the order, she claimed misinformation from 
Lundahl's counsel caused her to skip the hearing at which spousal support was reduced to 
$500. The court rejected her claim of extrinsic fraud or mistake, concluding she "was in 
court on the 18th, she knew of the continued date, she may have misunderstood, I'll give 
her the benefit, [but] I don't think there is any . . . extrinsic fraud, or any showing here 
that she was denied her right to appear . . . ." (In re Marriage of Lundahl (Aug. 26, 1997, 
GO 19679) [nonpub. opn.], p. 4.) On appeal, Telford changed tactics and asserted for the 
first time the trial court "was without in personam or in rem jurisdiction . . . because she 
made a special appearance . . . and there was no other basis on which the court could 
assume jurisdiction." (Ibid.) We concluded Telford waived the argument, and further 
noted the record did not establish a special appearance and that, even if it had, "the court, 
Telford did not sign the stipulation and she insists the District Attorney's 
Office could not waive her right to arrears, a point we need not reach on this appeal since 
the trial court deferred calculation of arrears, as we discuss below. 
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pursuant to the dissolution judgment, maintained jurisdiction over the parties and spousal 
support." (Id. at p. 5.) 
In February 1999, after a hearing in Utah at which Lundahl again failed to 
appear, the Utah court entered an order establishing "back alimony" at $62,991.72, plus 
interest, as well as $500 in attorney fees. The court's order did not specify the period 
covered by the $62,991.72 figure. 
On October 24, 2001, the family support division of the Orange County 
District Attorney's Office registered the two 1991 Utah orders and the 1993, 1995, and 
1999 Utah orders for enforcement in California. Lundahl subsequently moved to vacate 
registration on five grounds: (1) the Utah court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; 
(2) the Utah support orders had been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order; 
(3) the amount of arrears was incorrect; (4) some or all of the arrears were not 
enforceable; and (5) laches. In an amended order entered on September 27, 2002, the 
trial court concluded Lundahl presented insufficient evidence to vacate registration on 
any of these grounds. On Lundahl's claim that the Utah orders were void for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, the court specifically found: "The Utah Court had jurisdiction 
to make the orders because there was concurrent jurisdiction in both Utah and 
California." The court confirmed registration of each of the Utah orders and ordered "all 
stays on enforcement lifted." 
The court "reserve[d] on the issue of the amount of arrears owed" and a 
hearing was eventually scheduled for several months later. In an abundance of caution, 
Lundahl appealed the trial court's denial of his petition to vacate registration of the Utah 
orders, and also sought a writ of supercedeas to stay enforcement of the registered orders. 
We denied the petition seeking writ relief. Meanwhile, in its ruling denying Lundahl's 
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petition to vacate registration, the trial court had ordered "the District Attorney's Office 
to use its best efforts to prepare an accounting of arrears" and mail it to the parties. On 
being apprised erf Lundahl's appeal, the trial court deferred the accounting pending our 
decision in this matter. 
II 
DISCUSSION 
A. Augmentation 
Preliminarily, we address Telford's motion to augment the record. (Cal. 
Rules of Court, rule 12(a).) The materials she submits for augmentation that were not 
before the trial court, including information regarding her disability and assistance she 
received from her church, cannot be made part of the record. "Augmentation does not 
function to supplement the record with materials not before the trial court." {Vons 
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fh. 3.) We therefore 
deny the motion. 
B. The Order Is Appealable 
As noted above, the trial court scheduled a subsequent hearing to determine 
the amount of arrears. Although respondents did not contest Lundahl's right to appeal, 
we requested further briefing on whether the appeal should be dismissed under the "one 
final judgment rule." (See First Security Bank of Cal. v. Paquet (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 
468, 473 [existence of appealable judgment is a jurisdictional prerequisite and reviewing 
court must raise on own motion].) "The 'one final judgment' rule provides that an appeal 
may be taken from a final judgment, but not an interlocutory judgment." {Id. at p. 472; 
Code Civ. Proc, § 904.1, subd. (a)(1) [generally barring appeal from interlocutory 
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judgments].) "The well-known final judgment rule that governs general civil appeals was 
designed to prevent costly piecemeal dispositions and multiple reviews which burden the 
courts and impede the judicial process." {Maranian v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd. 
(2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073.) 
Yet "'[a] decree is none the less final because some future orders of the 
court may become necessary to carry it into effect; . . . nor because, when the merits of 
the controversy are adjudicated upon, and the equities of the parties definitely settled, an 
account is directed to be taken to ascertain what sum is due from one to the other, as the 
result of the decision made by the court' [citation] . . . ." {Guaranty Trust & Savings 
Bankv. City ofLos Angeles (1921) 186 Cal. 110, 116-117.) "'If the judgment stand the 
test of the inquiry as to whether it disposes of the merits of the action, and terminates the 
controverted issues, the fact that further proceedings remain to be taken in court to make 
it effective does not affect its finality.' [Citation.]" {Ibid/, accord Warmington Old Town 
Associates v. Tustin Unified School Dist. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 840, 848-849.) 
Here, the court resolved Lundahl's attempt to vacate registration of the 
Utah orders on the merits, leaving only the calculation of arrearages. "[M]ost courts 
recognize the general rule that finality for purposes of appeal is not necessarily destroyed 
by reason of a provision for future accounting. The determinative factor is whether the 
equities have been finally adjudicated or the rights of the parties ascertained and finally 
determined." (Annot, Finality of Judgment or Decree for Purposes of Review as 
Affected by Provision for Future Accounting (1949) 3 A.L.R.2d 342, 346.) As our 
Supreme Court has explained, a judicial determination "'is final "when it terminates the 
litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but 
to enforce by execution what has been determined.'" [Citations.]" {Sullivan v. Delta Air 
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Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 304.) With denial of Lundahl's petition to vacate 
registration and the lifting of "all stays on enforcement" on the registered orders, 
Lundahl's assets became subject to execution. The trial court's order adjudicated the 
merits of the case, and is therefore appealable.4 
C. Jurisdictional Claims 
Lundahl's sole contention on appeal is that the Utah orders were void for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the parties' 1977 divorce in California invested 
California with exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support. He argues the Utah orders 
were thus unenforceable and the court erred by not vacating registration. Section 4956, 
subdivision (5), requires registration of a support order to be vacated where a defense to 
enforcement exists under state law. "C"A void judgment or order is, in legal effect, no 
judgment,'"" and cannot be enforced. {Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998) 
67 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1240; cf. Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 19A West's Ann. Code 
Civ. Proc. (1982 ed.) foil. § 1710.40, p. 694 ["Common defenses to enforcement of a 
sister state judgment include . . . [that] the judgment was rendered in excess of 
jurisdiction . . . "].) Whether California had sole subject matter jurisdiction over spousal 
support is a question of law that we review de novo. (See Robbins v. Foothill Nissan 
(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1769, 1774 [subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law].) 
4
 Cowan v. Moreno (Tex.Ct.App. 1995) 903 S.W.2d 119 is not to the 
contrary. There, in an appeal from an attempt to register an order of support under 
UIFSA, the court determined an order leaving arrears to be determined was not 
appealable under Texas's one final judgment rule. But the reviewing court noted that, in 
addition to arrears, the trial court "expressly declined to rule on the merits of the 
[registration] petition . . . ." {Id. at p. 124.) Thus, the court distinguished "those cases" 
where "the substantive rights of the parties had been settled and the only issue was 
enforcement." {Ibid.) Here, the substantive rights of the parties have been settled by a 
final decision, and the appeal is therefore properly before us. 
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1. No Reservation of Exclusive Jurisdiction in Divorce Decree 
The terms of the 1977 California divorce decree do not support Lundahl's 
claim it vested the state with exclusive jurisdiction over spousal support. Lundahl seizes 
upon the final paragraph of the divorce decree, labeled "Reservation of Jurisdiction" 
which states: "The court reserves jurisdiction of the above-entitled matter and as to all 
such issues as may be necessary to effect the purposes and intent of this order." The 
word "exclusive" is simply not present in this language. We may not insert terms into a 
document that are not there (Code Civ. Proc, § 1858), and a fortiori, nor may a party. 
Lundahl also relies on our 1997 opinion in the prior appeal between the parties in which 
we concluded "the [trial] court, pursuant to the dissolution judgment, maintained 
jurisdiction over the parties and spousal support." But the issue there was whether the 
trial court had jurisdiction, not whether its jurisdiction was exclusive. Because the issue 
was not raised, our opinion did not decide that jurisdiction in California precluded 
jurisdiction in Utah. (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 
893, 943 ["[c]ases are not authority, of course, for issues not raised or resolved"].) 
2. No Exclusive Jurisdiction Under RURESA 
Lundahl's argument under RURESA is similarly without merit. He 
contends: "Under RURESA, the Utah orders are surplusage and do not and cannot create 
greater liabilities than that imposed by the California dissolution court." RURESA was 
in effect in California at the time of the 1977 divorce decree through the 1994 order 
reducing spousal support to $500 a month.5 It also covered the 1991, 1993, and 1995 
5
 California adopted RURESA in 1968 (see Scott v. Superior Court (1984) 
156 Cal.App.3d 577, 584), and in 1994 recodified it under the Family Code without 
substantive change. (See In re Marriage of Chester (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1624, 1630 & 
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Utah orders, but not the 1999 Utah arreages order, which we discuss separately below. 
Contrary to Lundahl's assertion, both Utah and California expressly recognize that 
RURESA sister states may issue independent support orders for differing amounts 
without having modified, superceded, or nullified each other's orders. (See, e.g., 
Kammersell v. Kammersell (Utah 1990) 792 P.2d 496, 498; In re Marriage of 
Popenhager (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 514, 521.) Thus, an obligor spouse was confronted 
with the very real possibility of "multiple and perhaps inconsistent orders enforceable 
against him." (In re Marriage ofStraeck (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 617, 624.) The court in 
Straeck concluded, "While sympathetic to an obligor placed in this dilemma, our reply is 
that RURESA contemplates and allows this result." (Ibid.; accord Kammersell v. 
Kammersell, supra, 792 P.2d at p. 498 ["This is currently the view of a majority of 
jurisdictions that have adopted URESA or RURESA"].) 
This view was grounded in section 31 of RURESA and section 30 of the 
former uniform act, URESA. As described in detail by an annotation, "Section 30 of 
[URESA] provided that 'no order of support issued by a court of this state when acting as 
a responding state shall supersede any other order of support but the amounts for a 
particular period paid pursuant to either order shall be credited against amounts accruing 
or accrued for the same period under both.5 In [RURESA], the substance of § 30 of 
[URESA] was transferred, with slight modification, to § 31, which states that a support 
fn. 4.) In 1998, California repealed RURESA and UIFSA became effective. (Stats. 
1997, ch. 194 (S.B. 568), § 2, codified at Fam. Code, §§ 4900 to 4976.) 
6
 Utah adopted RURESA in 1980. (Utah Laws 1980, ch. 15, § 2, codified at 
former Utah Code (1953) §§ 77-31-1 to 77-31-39.) RURESA remained in effect until 
UIFSA was substituted in 1997. (Utah Laws 1996, ch. 149, § 2; see also Utah Laws 
1997, ch. 232, renumbering UIFSA codification at Utah Code (1953) §§ 78-45f-100 to 
78-45f-901.) 
11 
order made by a court of this state pursuant to this Act does not nullify and is not 
nullified by a support order made by a court of this state pursuant to any other law or by a 
support order made by a court of any other state pursuant to a substantially similar Act or 
any other law, regardless of priority of issuance, unless otherwise specifically provided 
by the court. Amounts paid for a particular period pursuant to any support order made by 
the court of another state shall be credited against the amounts accruing or accrued for the 
same period under any support order made by the court of this state.'" (Annot, 
Construction and Effect of Provision of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 
That No Support Order Shall Supersede or Nullify Any Other Order (1984) 31 A.L.R.4th 
347, 351-352 (Annotation).) 
Notably, RURESA did not distinguish between child support orders and 
spousal support orders. (See UIFSA Com., 29D West's Ann. Fam. Code (2004 supp.) 
foil. § 4914, pp. 307-308 [under UIFSA, "[a]n order for spousal support is treated 
differently than an order for child support. . . . This marks a radical departure from 
RURESA, which treated spousal and child support orders identically"].) Hence, the 
principles articulated for RURESA child support orders apply equally to spousal support 
orders. In particular, a court "is not prevented from entering a child support order 
different from that previously ordered, on the basis that such an award is effective 
prospectively only, and thus the court is not nullifying or superseding the prior order 
within the meaning of the provision . . . . In such cases, the courts have reasoned that 
proceedings under the Act are de novo, in that the responding court has the authority to 
make an independent determination regarding the duty of support based on presently 
existing conditions, that the remedies under the Act are in addition to and not in 
substitution for any other remedies, and that the Act contemplates that more than one 
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order of support may be outstanding at any given time for the same obligation." 
(Annotation, supra, 31 A.L.R.4th at p. 352, fns. deleted.) 
Concisely stated, under RURESA: "[N]ew support orders do not nullify, 
modify, or supersede the original support decree, but instead provide an additional, 
supplementary or cumulative remedy. [Citations.] Amounts paid under one support 
order are credited against amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under another 
support order. This latter language necessarily contemplates that two or more support 
orders may be outstanding and valid at the same time. [Citations.] Thus, 'the authority 
,of the court originally ordering payment is not affected nor is its order modified by an 
order of the court of the responding state fixing another or different sum.' [Citation.]" 
{Thompson v. Thompson (S.D. 1985) 366 N.W.2d 845, 847-848.) 
This result "oftentimes works to the detriment of the obligor, usually the 
husband, since even if the responding court in a URESA [or RURESA] proceeding 
prospectively reduces the amount of support owed, he may still be obligated for the full 
amount of support as determined by the original child support order . . . , although under 
the antinullification provision of the Act, he will get credit for any amounts paid pursuant 
to an order made under the Act." (Annotation, supra, 31 A.L.R.4th at p. 354; accord 
Oglesbyv. Oglesby (1973) 510 P.2d 1106, 1107-1108 [reduction of support by 
Washington court did not relieve husband of higher obligation owed under earlier Utah 
divorce decree].) Because RURESA contemplates that "more than one order of support 
may be outstanding at any given time for the same obligation" (Annotation, supra, 31 
A.L.R.4th at p. 352), Lundahl's argument that the California divorce decree was 
controlling, and that the subsequent Utah support orders were void under RURESA, is 
simply wrong. 
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3. UIFSA Does Not Determine Controlling Order for Spousal Support 
Switching tacks, Lundahl next argues that under new provisions in UIFSA, 
which superceded RURESA in Utah in 1997 and in California in 1998, California family 
courts retained "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" over spousal support. Lundahl 
misreads UIFSA. True, UIFSA "was developed to improve the two prior uniform laws 
concerning enforcement of family support orders, URESA and the Revised Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA). [Citation.]" {Child Support 
Enforcement Div, of Alaska v. Brenckle (Mass. 1997) 675 N.E.2d 390, 392.) And 
"UIFSA aims to cure the problem of conflicting support orders entered by multiple 
courts, and provides for the exercise of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by one tribunal 
over support orders. [Citation.]" {Ibid, [construing UIFSA in context of child support 
enforcement action].) But as we discuss below, UIFSA's mechanism for establishing a 
"controlling order" applies only to multiple child support orders. (See Sampson, Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (With Unofficial Annotations) (1993) 27 Fam. L.Q. 93, 
121 n.69 [UIFSA's "avoidance of interstate modification of alimony decrees reflects, at 
least in part, the disinterest in the topic of the Drafting Committee and its co-reporters, 
advisors and observers. Throughout the revision process the focus of all concerned was 
almost entirely on child support"]; cf. Hatamyar, Critical Applications and Proposals for 
Improvement of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and the Full Faith and Credit 
for Child Support Orders Act (1997) 71 St. John's L.Rev. 1, 22 ["The drafters apparently 
crafted UIFSA's rules concerning simultaneous proceedings in two states with child 
support, not spousal support, in mind"].) 
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Lundahl seizes on the fact that, for both child support orders and spousal 
support orders, UIFSA provides for "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" in the court 
issuing the order. (§ 4909, subd. (a) [regarding child support orders]; § 4909, 
subd. (f) [regarding spousal support orders].) Section 4909, subdivision (f), states in 
relevant part, "A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of 
this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order throughout 
the existence of the support obligation." But as courts have recognized, there can be 
under UIFSA — however paradoxical — multiple sister state tribunals having 
"continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." (See, e.g., In re Parenzan (2001) 727 N.Y.S.2d 163, 
168 [when more than one state has issued a support order, "UIFSA acknowledges that 
more than one tribunal could have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under UIFSA . . ."]; 
see also § 4911, subd. (b)(2) [describing procedure for settling on a "controlling" child 
support order when "more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive 
jurisdiction under this chapter . . ."].) 
The official comment to the definition section of UIFSA, codified at section 
4901, is instructive: "Until valid orders issued under [URESA and RURESA] expire of 
their own terms or are replaced by new UIFSA orders, the support orders themselves will 
continue to have vitality . . . . In short, UIFSA is specifically designed to function with 
the earlier acts without conflict. Support orders issued under one of the earlier acts 
should be honored and enforced in every State. . . . States are directed to accord full 
enforcement remedies to support orders issued under the prior acts, but they must apply 
UIFSA restraint regarding modification. In situations involving multiple orders created 
under the former system, UIFSA mandates the application of its one-order rules to 
determine the single order that is entitled to prospective enforcement, see Section 207 
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[Fam. Code, § 4911], infra." (UIFSA Com., 29D West's Ann. Fam. Code (2004 supp.) 
foil. § 4901, pp. 285; see generally Smith v. Superior Court (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 457, 
463 [commissioners' comments entitled to "'"substantial weight in construing the 
statutes'""].) 
Section 207 of UIFSA, entitled "Recognition of controlling child-support 
order" as codified in section 4911, describes the procedure for settling on a "controlling" 
order when two or more child support orders exist. Subdivision (b) of section 4911 
provides: "If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and two or more child support 
orders have been issued by tribunals of this state or another state with regard to the same 
obligor and child, a tribunal of this state shall apply the following rules in determining 
which order to recognize for purposes of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction: [f] (1) If 
only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, 
the order of that tribunal controls and shall be so recognized. [*[[] (2) If more than one of 
the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, an order 
issued by a tribunal in the current home state of the child controls and shall be so 
recognized, but if an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the 
order most recently issued controls and shall be so recognized. [^ ] (3) If none of the 
tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under this chapter, the tribunal of 
this state having jurisdiction over the parties shall issue a child support order, which 
controls and shall be so recognized." (Italics added.) The controlling order is 
prospective only (§ 4909, subd. (c)), so sections 4913 and 4913.5 provide for credit of 
payments on one or more past support orders against obligations owed on other orders. 
The drafters explained the intended effect of sections 4911, 4913, and 
4913.5 as follows: "Sections 207 [§ 4911] and 209-210 [§§ 4913-4913.5] are designed to 
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span the gulf between the one-order system created by UIFSA and the multiple-order 
system previously in place under RURESA and URESA. UIFSA necessarily must 
provide transitional procedures for the eventual elimination of existing multiple support 
orders in an expeditious and efficient manner. But, even though all U.S. jurisdictions 
enacted UIFSA by 1998, many years will pass before its one-order system will be 
completely in place. Multiple orders covering the same parties and child number in the 
hundreds of thousands; it can be reasonably anticipated that some of these orders will 
continue in effect until nearly 2020. To begin the journey toward a one-order system, 
however, this section provides a relatively simple procedure designed to identify a single 
viable order that will be entitled to prospective enforcement in every UIFSA State.55 
(UIFSA Com, 29D West's Ann. Fam. Code (2004 supp.) foil. § 4911, p. 302.) To be 
sure, the comment speaks broadly of a "single viable order,55 but that language must be 
read in the context of the section commented upon — section 4911. By its terms section 
4911 resolves the multiple order systems of URESA and RURESA into a one-order 
system only for child support, not spousal support. 
The adoption of UIFSA has narrowed the options for obligors like Lundahl. 
Under URESA and RURESA, new support orders in a sister state were deemed to be a 
cumulative remedy, not a modification of the original order. But these statutes also 
provided for modification of a court order from a sister state, if the modification was 
litigated and noted explicitly on the new order. {In re Marriage ofStraeck, supra, 156 
Cal.App.3d at p. 625 ["the obligor could request that the court specifically provide that 
the new order supersedes or modifies all other orders . . ."]; accord In re Marriage of 
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Ward (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1456.) An obligor could thus gain protection against 
multiple orders by securing a statement of express modification in the new order. 
But UIFSA now permits modification of a spousal support order only by 
the court issuing the order. Section 4909, subdivision (f), states: "A tribunal of this state 
may not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state having 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state." As such, 
"the CEJ [Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction] of the issuing State over a spousal support 
order is permanent " (UIFSA Com., 29D West's Ann. Fam. Code (2004 supp.) foil. 
§ 4909, p. 297.) The UIFSA drrfters explain: "Under UIFSA, 'interstate5 modification 
of spousal support is limited to a procedure whereby a proceeding may be initiated 
outside of the issuing State, but only the tribunal in the original issuing State may modify 
the order under its law. This approach was expected to have minimal effect on actual 
practice, a prediction that appears to have been accurate. Interstate modification of pure 
This provision in URESA and RURESA for express modification 
distinguishes the litany of inapposite Utah cases relied upon by Lundahl. In Bankler v. 
Bankler (UtahCt.App. 1998) 963 P.2d 797, 800, the court stated: "Actions to modify a 
divorce decree should 'properly be brought in the forum which issued the decree.3 
[Citation.] '[T]he court issuing the original decree retains exclusive jurisdiction to 
modify its decrees. Parties wishing to modify a decree must do so in the original 
forum'" But in Bankler, the issue was domestication of a sister state divorce decree 
under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, not express modification of the decree under 
RURESA or entry of an independent support order as permitted by the act. Similarly, 
Rimensburger v. Rimensburger (UtahCt.App. 1992) 841 P.2d 709, 711, did not involve 
modification of an another state court's judgment under RURESA, but rather 
modification by one Utah court of a divorce decree issued by another Utah court, long 
prohibited by Utah venue precedent. And Christensen v. Christensen (Utah 1925) 239 P. 
501, 503, in which the court held, "an application like the one in question here [intrastate 
support modification] should be made in the original divorce action and not by an 
independent proceeding," predated RURESA by decades. Again, "[c]ases are not 
authority, of course, for issues not raised or resolved." (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 943; accord Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. Oregon Short 
LineR. Co. (Utah 1914) 148 P. 439, 444.) 
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